excess and obsolete SA/LW, and has provided over US$1.3 billion to humanitarian mine
action in the past two decades. Governments
such as Japan, Canada and members of the
European Union likewise contribute in order
to promote the conditions for such security to
take root.
The reason Just War theory has endured
through the vicissitudes of Western history
is because it bridges our moral ideals with
the realities of a world characterized by
self-interested—and often violent—power
politics. What many do not realize is that
Just War theory underlies many of our
assumptions in the West, such as those
governing proportionality and noncombatant
immunity. Perhaps of equal importance is
that it provides a rationale for what we can do
to promote security around the world.
See Endnotes Page 111
For additional references for this article,
please visit http://tinyurl.com/krcvum.

With financial assistance from the U.S. State Department, Senegal has successfully collected and destroyed more than
4,000 small arms, including MAS-36 submachine guns and MAT-49 rifles.

This Falklands-Malvinas Islands minefield is a sanctuary for penguins. The birds’ ground-bearing pressure is insufficient to set off the mines, and their predators are too big to
enter the minefield.
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suicide bombings to cause both mass casualties and widespread panic. Again, the point is
that criminals and insurgents are turning a tool
necessary for national defense on those who are
unsuspecting and unarmed. Sadly, legacy landmines—some of which have been in the ground
for decades—do not discriminate between warriors and innocents, making them an additional passive, yet deadly disruptor of prosperity.
The issue of ending war well. Finally, I believe that recent on Just War Theory completed
by Bian Orend, Michael Water, and myself, poses a third question: “What does an ethical end to
war look like?” Certainly in the past decade, we
have seen strides toward more just and durable peace agreements than ever before, such as
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration3 efforts, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, prosecutorial attempts
against warmongers like Slobodan Milosevic,
reconciliation processes and the like. An important component of DDR is those processes
by which the national government asserts control over the military hardware it dispensed
during the conflict. Government authorities
should collect these items, professionalize the
forces handling the weapons, safely and securely stockpile them, and destroy the excess
and obsolete items from their stocks, lest they
become tools for renewed conflict.
When it comes to landmines and associated ERW, establishing long-term conditions
of peace means stewardship of land resources, including reclamation of transport links,
water points and farmland from contamina-

tion. This process is “ending well”: moving
beyond the conditions from which conflict
commenced. Furthermore, it is more often the
case that such issues are seen as regional and
international inhibitors to peace, so international partnerships with foreign governments
or nongovernmental organizations provide
necessary assistance to ameliorate the legacies
of conflict. This is jus post bellum.
Pragmatic International Security
This article has demonstrated that some of
the ways we think about the destructive legacies of war, such as ERW and the proliferation
of illicit SA/LW, have roots in venerable Just
War theory; however, the Just War tradition
should not be thought of as merely an academic exercise. It marries real-world pragmatism
with our hopes for security and justice.
Elsewhere I have argued that jus post
bellum—post-conflict law, or ending war
well—begins with political order and sometimes moves beyond mere order to justice. In
a handful of instances, reconciliation can be
the result. 3 That is the goal many of us hope
for when the hot war ends; however, without a durable sociopolitical order—from basic safety to confidence that the land can be
tilled and water can be drawn safely to assure that the weapons of war have been safely
stored—such security is but a fantasy. Consequently, the efforts of major governments and
nongovernmental actors in this regard are
critical. For example, the U.S. State Department funds efforts to secure and/or destroy
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Clearing the Falkland-Malvinas Islands
Under pressure from nations around the world and in compliance with Article 5, the U.K. has committed to
demining the Falkland-Malvinas Islands, despite the potential cost of demining in a relatively mine-safe1 area.
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting Ltd. ]

W

hile the news of the United Kingdom’s decision, under
global pressure, to begin demining the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands does show a commitment to holding countries to
the agreements set up by Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention, 2,3 the location and situation of the landmines in discussion raise the question:
Is demanding that the Falkland-Malvinas Islands be cleared a triumph
in international diplomacy or a break with common sense? There are
five distinct points that need to be made about this decision.
Cost of Demining
The Falkland-Malvinas Islands clearance process will be very
expensive. First of all, the existing mines are laid mainly on the beaches
and in soft ground. The result is that the mines may move in the peat
and may be affected by the tides, complicating the process. Although a
completed feasibility study shows that clearance may be possible, there are
clear implications for cost. The recent U.K./Argentina feasibility study,
of which the main element was a field survey conducted by Cranfield
University, concludes that mine clearance in the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands is possible but will present significant technical challenges and
risks, which include risks related to possible environmental impact.4
While the feasibility study suggests that it is possible to grade
the problem into degrees of complexity, the report does not identify costs (nor are there significant benefits against which these costs

should be compared). The problem caused by this absolutist position is
that we cannot now say that the British government can clear the easiest
of these four categories and leave the hardest. To be Article 5-compliant,
the British government has to clear them all, thus negating much of the
benefit of this useful study.
No Casualties in Over 20 Years
These mines pose a minimal threat to the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands. There have been no civilian casualties since 1982, 5 and there is
little demand for the contaminated land. The Islanders themselves have
been very vocal in asking the British government to spend its money elsewhere. Mike Summers, a member of the legislative council of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands government, echoes this sentiment, saying, “There
are a lot of mines in the Falklands, but they are not that intrusive. Clearly
there is an issue about clearance, but unless they are cleared 110 percent,
we are not going to take the fences down anyway. If that can be done, then
fine. If the British government was to invest money in clearing mines,
then we would be more than happy for them to invest it in other countries.
Our needs are not as pressing as other people’s.”5 He goes on to say, “That
doesn’t mean that in the fullness of time we don’t want it done. But we
would feel somewhat embarrassed if the British government spent money
clearing mines in the Falklands if there was an opportunity to spend it in
some other territory where there are children and adults at risk.”5
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Environmental Harm
The clearance methods are likely to be invasive and harmful to the environment. The
feasibility study reviewed a number of potential clearance methods including flailing,
milling and bulk excavation. Some of these
methods may endanger what have become excellent bird sanctuaries for penguins, as the
groundbearing pressure of these birds is too
small to set off anti-personnel mines. The feasibility study identifies a number of remediation techniques that will then be used to solve
the environmental damage caused by the demining process, which will, of course, contribute to the cost.
Total Contributions
There is also a risk that the British government will treat this clearance as a contribution to its global mine-clearance effort. If this
is allowed, then there may be a commensurate
reduction in contributions to situations where
it does make a difference. A parliamentary
question to the British government asking for
confirmation that the funding to demine the
Falkland-Malvinas Islands will be treated as
additional money would be a useful way of resolving this problem.
Past Deminer Casualties
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
main reason the British Army stopped clearance in the 1980s was the number of deminer casualties that occurred during the process.
The feasibility study again is useful in spelling
out a number of risk-management strategies
that could be employed. The work the international community has done in the development
of the International Mine Action Standards
should also be recognized as potentially being
instrumental in helping reduce deminer casualties. However, a reduced risk in casualties is
still higher than the zero risk in deminer casualties that is currently achieved by leaving these

minefields alone. In attempting to clear them,
one should conduct a risk/benefit analysis, and
given that the benefit is negligible according to
the feasibility study, it is hard to see how even a
marginal increase in deminer risk is justified. Of
course, the risk to the individual deminer can be
compensated on an economic basis through the
provision of incentives (i.e., salary), but this issue goes back to the cost/benefit analysis which,
although currently incomplete, suggests that
clearance of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands simply is not worth it.

in the Kyoto Protocol. 8 Given that landmines
are forms of environmental pollution,
countries that have a non-impact landmine
problem could be allowed to offset them with
an equivalent donation (under Article 6)9 to
a country that is actually suffering impact
from its contamination. An idea like this one
was already suggested in the context of the
Falkland-Malvinas Islands, and perhaps it is
time to see it come to fruition.
See Endnotes, Page 111
For additional reading for this article,
please visit http://tinyurl.com/c5aqat.

Intent of Ottawa Convention
One possible objection to this approach toward the Falkland-Malvinas Islands is that it
would be a fundamental blow to the integrity
of the Ottawa Convention, which was drafted
specifically to prevent loopholes and other special pleading weakening its effectiveness. This
observation is valid; however, I would take a
wider view. The whole point of the campaign
is to reduce the humanitarian suffering caused
by AP mines in the sense that these weapons
are indiscriminate and excessively injurious.
Given circumstances of scarce resources, a
condition shared by humanitarian mine-action programs, it seems that to enforce part of
the Convention in circumstances where there
is no humanitarian impact is missing the original purpose of the ban.
A Possible Way Ahead
This perspective may seem very negative in
terms of the current formulation of the Ottawa
Convention and in particular toward Article
5. However, I believe that the Ottawa Process
has been so successful in the stigmatization
of this approach that it is robust enough to
sustain some amendments. One can see a
prime example of a piece of legislation that has
survived several significant amendments in the
U.S. Constitution.7 Lessons can also be taken
from the carbon-trading concept enshrined

Until that time, there is a need to mitigate their impact, minimize the number of new victims and assure better
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The United States has contributed $1.5 million to Mines Advisory Group for landmine clearance in Lebanon. Twelve thousand square kilometers (7,456 square miles) of land in Lebanon are affected by cluster bombs, which remain from the 2006
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Many of these bombs failed to detonate on impact and pose a continuing risk to the
Lebanese population.
Recently, there has been a reduction in funding by donors for mine-clearance groups in Lebanon, which has and led to fears
that clearance in the country could come to an end. BACTEC, a commercial demining team based in the U.K., was forced to
end operations in the country. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency and Norwegian’s People’s Aid are both lacking funds, while
DanChurchAid has cut its demining teams from five to two. The U.S. donation will keep 10 clearance companies in Lebanon
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Ending the decades-long violence in Colombia is the only way to eliminate all landmines from the country.

assistance to survivors.

U.S. Donations to Lebanon Help with Immense Needs

until the 2009’ summer’s end, although MAG is still seeking donations to continue its work.

International Support to Mine Action
in Colombia: Mitigating Impact and
Protecting Rights

O

ngoing internal armed conflict1 is the determining factor in
the landmine problem in Colombia. It is not simply one more
element to take into consideration; it completely alters the
panorama. Mines are a product of that conflict. As long as they are active instruments in the dispute between forces, with each mine having
an interested owner, mines will be a continuing source of risk for the
population. As a result, people are confined, displaced and denied access
to the necessities of daily life. The impact of mines never goes away for
the victims, nor for their families and their communities.
Resolving the conflict is the only way to eliminate all mines from the
national territory, and it is the only way to enable all Colombians to live
without the trauma, loss of life, and social and economic blockages produced by landmines.
All Colombians have the right to live without the risk of finding a
mine in their path. They have the right to cultivate their fertile lands,
many of which have been abandoned due to fear. Until the conflict is resolved, however, the impact of mines must be reduced, better assistance
must be provided to all current survivors and the number of new victims
must be minimized.
Colombia is one of the few countries in the Americas where antipersonnel landmines are in active use. 2 Landmine victims have been
recorded in Colombia since 1990, but the number rose sharply beginning in 2001. Reasons for the increase may include the heightened use
of landmines by guerrilla groups, improvement of reporting measurement mechanisms and the increased movement of the population. 2
Today the problem affects people living in 31 of the 32 Colombian departments3 and 60 percent of municipalities, with particular presence
in rural communities.4
Colombia is among the countries with the greatest number of new
victims. According to the 2007 Landmine Monitor Report, Colombia
had 1,106 mine victims in 2006, which is greater than three victims per
day. That same year, two-thirds of the victims were from the Army and
police, which is the highest proportion anywhere in the world. The civilian
victims alone (314, nearly one each day) were enough to place Colombia
among the three countries with the most new mine victims. 5 Though
there was a decrease in victims the following year, Colombia continued
to have more new victims than any other country. In 2007, there were
895 victims: 193 were killed and 702 who were injured. 2
The presence of landmines in the different regions of the country
changes according to the evolution of the armed conflict, as demonstrated by comparing the locations of civilian victims over the period
1990–2006 with those recorded in 2007. During this period, the four departments 6 with the greatest number of civilian victims were Antioquia,

A community in Nariño, a province in southern Colombia, took part in a meeting against
mines in its territory. Nariño has mines in 35 of its 63 municipalities.
PHOTO COURTESY OF BORJA PALADINI

Meta, Bolívar and Caquetá. Antioquia had more victims than the other
three combined. In 2007, the four departments with the highest number of casualties were Nariño, Antioquia, Guaviare and Arauca. Nariño
had more than the other three combined, reflecting the intensification
of armed conflict there. 2
What Can Be Done?
Considering the experiences of similarly contaminated countries,
there are three lines of action that can be taken by various levels of government and civil society with the support of international organizations, even during a period of armed conflict. These measures include:
1. Reduce risk
2. Provide comprehensive support to victims
3. Develop the capacity to coordinate and manage a multifaceted
response to the landmine problem
Reduce risk. People have a need and a right to know how to protect themselves from danger, and the public sector has an obligation
to inform them. There are many mine-risk education programs that
have been developed around the world through mass media, schools,
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